Wittgenstein and Freud

Philosophical Reflections on Psychoanalysis


Is Science Providing Evidence for Freud’s Concept of the Unconscious?

In the face of attacks on the validity of psychoanalysis, it is tempting to argue that science and especially neurology is providing empirical evidence that Freud was right. Scientific evidence for unconscious processes includes research demonstrating that individuals process information, make decisions, and change their behaviour based on stimuli that are below conscious awareness.

For example, studies have shown that people tend to develop positive attitudes to stimuli they’ve been exposed to repeatedly, even if they don’t consciously remember seeing them. People can also be influenced by stimuli presented too quickly to be consciously perceived. Furthermore, brain imaging techniques showing neural activity associated with processing information even when the individual is not aware that this is going on. So, doesn’t this provide evidence that Freud was right?

In a word, no. Let’s take an example from sport. A footballer scores a goal that exploits the fact that the goalkeeper was slightly mispositioned. In some cases, the footballer may explain that they noticed the goalkeeper was off her line and so aimed for the top left-hand corner. In other cases the footballer may just say: I realised that I had a shooting opportunity so I went for it. In other words, her shot was instinctive. It happened too fast for her to think: the goalkeeper is off her line. Subconsciously, however, she saw the gap and did what was needed to seize the opportunity.

A lot of what happens in sport is based on actions and reactions that are not conscious (or not fully conscious). This undermines the Cartesian idea that human behaviour involves our (rational) mind giving instructions to our (mechanical) bodies. But it has nothing to do with the aspects of human life that psychoanalysis is interested in. This sort of example does not demonstrate that our feelings are typically ambivalent, that we repress aspects of ourselves that we do not like, that our early experiences leave us with unprocessed emotions that shape our lives, etc. Research into split-second decision-making and other such phenomena is fascinating, but the unconscious (or better subconscious) processes involved have nothing to do with the unconscious processes investigated by psychoanalysts.

Does this mean that there is no “empirical” evidence for Freud’s Unconscious? Certainly not. You would need to be a poor observer of human life not to have to have come across masses of evidence for it. Look (as Freud did) at the verbal slips, mistakes and missteps that happen everyday and you will see people doing things that on some level they want to do even when they sincerely tell you that the consequences of their action were not at all what they (consciously) intended.

If you explore almost any situation where a joke is made, you will discover that the joke fulfilled a purpose that was not consciously in the mind of the person who made it. The person who made the joke may say that they just wanted to break the tension within the group and they may (genuinely) claim to be as surprised as anyone else when you point out the joke cast an unfavourable light on the person in the group they like the least, but when this sort of thing happens systematically it is not tenable to claim that it is inexplicable (“just lots of coincidences”).

Psychoanalysts have been criticised for relying on evidence from the consulting room, but there is plenty of evidence in everyday life. Freud’s concept of the Unconscious provides a way of exploring the contradictions and complexities of the human heart. His fundamental point is that we do not know ourselves anywhere near as well as we like to think we do – and that is not something that neurology can provide evidence for.



2 responses to “Is Science Providing Evidence for Freud’s Concept of the Unconscious?”

  1. Agree that the subconscious and dynamic unconscious are not helpfully elided.

    Now, I’m wondering what the content of the idea of subconsciously driven action really is. … Take the footballer who instinctually shoots at the best place in the goal aperture without stopping to think about it. Does what the footballer provides by way of explanation of why they aimed where they did tell us anything about whether the action was consciously chosen or subconsciously driven? Or take your speaking to your wife of an evening. You say ‘might you pour me another glass?’ and when you say ‘pour’ your mouth produces this ‘o’ sound in the middle of the word. Did you choose to make this sound? Do you have a good explanation of why you made it then? Was the production of this sound conscious or unconscious? What shall we say? … Well, it wasn’t a mistake or a spasm!

    I once jumped when I encountered a snake on the path. I want to say that my jumping was subconsciously generated. Why? Well, I want to say that I didn’t “consciously see it” or “recognise what was in front of me” until after I’d already jumped – this is why I reach for the ‘subconsciously generated’ idea. What are the criteria for recognising something? Not simply that I jump but that I can say what I see. “I couldn’t have said what I saw, or, if you like, what I encountered, until later”. (These dissociations are like those encountered in so-called blindsight.) (It’s very important of course that we don’t advert to neurology to answer such questions. Neurology has enough questions of its own to answer about such phenomena.)

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    1. Yes. I agree it can all get confused and confusing here. When someone kicks a football, they don’t consciously activate all the relevant muscles involved in this action, but it would also be strange (or at least pointless) to say that they activated the individual muscles sub-consciously. I suppose it depends what kind of distinction you are making and what you want to use it for. My main point was that just because in one type of context you can make a case for talking of (certain kinds of) unconscious processes, this does not provide justification for talking about totally different kinds of unconscious processes in a radically different context. The fact that when I lend something to my friend Bob it disappears into a black hole is not proof that black holes really exist.

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